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RACE-BASED JURY NULLIFICATION:
REBUTTAL (PART A)
ANDREW D. LEIPOLD*

Professor Butler's remarks strike a responsive cord. No one
can study the statistics on race and crime in this country without
being profoundly disturbed by them. Thus, to partially answer the
question Paul left with us, do I think that the criminal justice system is perfect the way it is? Of course not. Do I think there are
severe problems involving race and justice? Of course I do. Do I
think the answer is selective jury nullification? Not even remotely.1
Professor Butler says he does not want to hear us suggest that
the answer is to write to Congress. That answer fails, he says, because right now the house is on fire, suggesting that more dramatic and more immediate action is needed. But even if the house
is on fire, I do not think we should embrace a solution that involves fanning the flames and making the fire worse. This is what
I fear selective race-based jury nullification will do.
Let me briefly outline a few of my concerns about Professor
Butler's plan. The first two are technical, lawyer-type arguments.
The last two address philosophical concerns I have about his proposal.
The first technical point involves the impact of Professor
Butler's proposal on the makeup of juries. I agree with Paul entirely about the importance of African-Americans serving on juries,
and the Supreme Court opinions he cites came out exactly right. It
is critically important to have juries that are reflective of community sentiments and community norms. Given this, we should ask
ourselves what juries will look like if large numbers of African-American potential jurors were to embrace the Butler plan.
I think the answer, without a doubt, is that there would be
fewer African-Americans seated on juries than there are today.
This is true for a couple reasons. As most of you know, the Su* Associate Professor of Law, University of Illinois College of Law; Visiting Professor; Duke University School of Law.
1. See Andrew D. Leipold, The Dangers of Race-Based Jury Nullification,
44 UCLA L. REV. 109 (1996) (responding to Paul Butler, Racially Based Jury

Nullification:Black Power in the Criminal Justice System, 105 YALE L.J. 677
(1995)). See also Andrew D. Leipold, Rethinking Jury Nullification, 82 VA. L.
REV. 253 (1996) [hereinafter Rethinking].

The John MarshallLaw Review

[30:923

preme Court has said that a lawyer may not use a peremptory
strike to remove a person from a jury panel because of the juror's
race or sex.2 If a party appears to be using peremptory challenges
in this manner, the judge can require the lawyer to give a raceneutral explanation for the strikes. This explanation does not
have to be very logical or intelligent-a party might remove a juror
because of body language, for example-it just has to be honest
and based on factors other than race.'
On the other hand, either party can have a person removed
from a jury panel for cause if that juror indicates during voir dire
that he or she will not follow the law contained in the instructions
given by the judge. For example, a potential juror in a capital case
who says that she will not under any circumstances impose the
death penalty can be removed for cause, because she has indicated
that she will not follow the law in that case.4
If potential African-American jurors were to embrace the
Butler plan, and if they were honest during voir dire, their belief
in jury nullification would at least give prosecutors a race-neutral
explanation for removing these jurors with their peremptory
strikes. In addition, if the jurors were candid in admitting that
they came to the jury box with a very strong presumption of acquitting a defendant regardless of what the facts show, such jurors
could almost certainly be removed for cause. Since there are no
limits on the number of challenges for cause, every AfricanAmerican juror who believed in race-based nullification might be
excused in certain cases. The result would inevitably be juries
that are less diverse; this surely can not be part of the solution
that Professor Butler seeks.
My second technical argument is that juries are incapable of
making reasoned nullification decisions, because at trial they will
not be given the information they need. At the heart of Professor
Butler's plan is the notion that juries should engage in a costbenefit analysis when deciding whether to convict. Jurors are
supposed to look at the defendant and ask, "Even if this defendant
committed the crime charged, what are the rewards of keeping
this person out of jail, and what are the risks to the community of
letting this person stay free?" The problem is that juries will never
hear the evidence that would help them answer this question.
Consider the problem in the context of a simple drug possession case. If we were sitting on a jury, what would we like to know
about the defendant before we decided whether to nullify his conviction? We would probably want to know whether the defendant

2. See, e.g., Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79, 85-86 (1986); J.E.B. v. Alabama ex rel. T.B., 511 U.S. 127, 141-42 (1994).
3. Purkett v. Elem, 115 S. Ct. 1769, 1770-71 (1995).
4. Adams v. Texas, 448 U.S. 38, 44 (1980).
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is contrite. We would want to know whether he had a criminal record, and if so, how serious were his prior crimes. We might want
to know whether there was anyone else involved in the crime who
is more blameworthy. We might wonder how the prosecution enforces this crime against others: are African-Americans disproportionately targeted or arrested for this type of crime? We might
also want to know about the potential sentences the defendant
would face if convicted; under our cost-benefit analysis, we might
be more willing to nullify if the defendant faced a stiff, mandatory
sentence.
The problem is that almost none of this information is admissible at trial. Defendants cannot be forced to testify, so the jurors
will often be unable to evaluate the defendant's contrition. Evidence of prior crimes is usually inadmissible, as is information on
possible sentences or the prosecution's enforcement scheme. In
short, through no fault of their own, jurors just will not be able to
engage in a meaningful cost-benefit analysis. The best they would
be able to do is speculate, based on what they think might be going
on, rather than on what is actually going on in the case at hand.
Maybe the response is that we should change the rules of evidence. Maybe we should let lawyers argue directly for nullification
so that the jury can hear more evidence on it-an idea that has its
own problems. 'However, until these steps are taken, the notion
that juries should make these cost-benefit decisions, but make
them blindly, is hard to justify.
My philosophical concerns begin with the idea of legitimizing
and institutionalizing a cost-benefit analysis as a method of jury
decision-making. Let us assume that a large number of people
have been exposed to Professor Butler's plan-as they obviously
have been-and that they embrace it as a wonderful idea. Once
we have agreed that jurors can legitimately decide the outcome of
cases by a cost-benefit analysis rather than by applying the law as
written to the evidence presented, we have started down a dangerous road. Is there any doubt that many other groups will also be
drawn to the cost-benefit analysis? Although Professor Butler is
careful to limit his plan to African-American jurors in cases where
African-Americans are allegedly involved in nonviolent crimes,
these are limits by fiat, not by logic.
There are undoubtedly other groups that will feel that they,
too, do not get a fair shake from the criminal justice system and
they, too, should come to the jury box with an eye toward nullifying the convictions of members of their groups. "What's so bad
about that," you ask? "Maybe that's the way all juries should decide cases." The problem with nullification is that once we tell a
jury, directly or indirectly, that it is okay to engage in an uninformed cost-benefit analysis, we have no moral basis for complaining about any decision that a jury makes.
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Assume that a jury nullifies in the case of a young African-American defendant who has been charged with simple possession. Maybe this is a good result: maybe in that specific case,
society is better off keeping another African-American kid out of
jail, away from a very harsh sentence. But now assume that the
next jury comes back and says, "Yes, we think this defendant battered his wife, but you know, she decided to stay in the marriage
rather than get a divorce, it looks like she provoked him by
spending too much time at her job, she was nagging him, et cetera,
and we are not going to send this guy to jail." When a jury recently acquitted a defendant who had raped a woman at knife
point because the woman was "asking for it" by dressing in a provocative manner, this also sounded like a cost-benefit analysis.5
We might be repelled by this reasoning, but we do not have any
standing to complain about the process by which the outcome was
reached. Those juries also engaged in a cost-benefit analysis, the
same process approved of by the Butler plan.
Cases like these cause me great concern, even though today
most observers agree that jury nullification is a relatively rare
event in the justice system. But if we legitimize and promote the
idea of nullification through Professor Butler's very effective and
very eloquent arguments, I am afraid his logic will outrun his limits and we will create more problems than we will solve. I am less
convinced than he is that the nullification power would be used
more often for socially desirable purposes than for socially harmful
ones.
The final concern I have is at the broadest philosophical level.
It is a comment that makes me very sad to have to raise at all:
whether you go to jail or get set free should not depend on the
color of your skin. Using race as the reason for acquitting or convicting is a bad idea, and no matter how strategic the reasoning
and no matter how good our intentions, it is still wrong. It is
wrong because it encourages the kind of stereotyping that had led
to problems in the first place. It is wrong because we are telling
people that they will never get equal justice in the courts and so
you should take whatever you can get, however you can get it, and
be satisfied with that. In short, the plan raises the flag of surrender in the fight for equal justice under the law.
I think Professor Butler has minimized the extent to which
courts have made significant-not perfect, not complete-but significant progress over the last twenty years in freeing the justice
system of bias. Is there a long way to go? Absolutely. However, is
it right to say that the system will never work, so we should abandon efforts to make this a system of laws and not of individuals,
5. See, Rethinking, supra note 1, at n.199 (citing Jury: Woman in Rape
Case 'Asked for It," CI. TRiB., Oct. 6, 1989, at 4).

19971

REBUTTAL (PARTA)

927

and use race as a proxy for blameworthiness? My hope is that African-American jurors, indeed all jurors, are smart enough to see
that this is not the answer. Whatever the problem and whatever
the answer might be, this surely is not it.

